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Letter to the Journal
To Litigate a Pandemic: Cases
in the United States Against
China and the Chinese




1. The devastation wrought by the spread of the novel coronavirus has
touched virtually every country and will affect countless lives and livelihoods
for years to come. In the midst of the ongoing pandemic, individuals in some
countries have sought legal redress through their own domestic courts. This
phenomenon seems most prevalent in the United States, where at least twenty
civil lawsuits had been filed as of June 2020—eighteen by private litigants,
and two by state attorneys general.1 This symposium contribution considers
the legal theories underlying these lawsuits and their prospects of success. It
* Alfred & Hanna Fromm Professor of International and Comparative Law,
University of California Hastings College of the Law (keitnerc@uchastings.edu).
Completed on 30 June 2020 and the websites were current as of this date unless
otherwise noted.
1 Readers can find the author’s written testimony on this issue before the U.S. Senate
Judiciary Committee, as well as oral testimony presented on June 23, 2020 and
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also considers legislative proposals that would create a new exception to for-
eign sovereign immunity for claims arising from a pandemic.
2. In certain circumstances, civil litigation can perform an important ex-
pressive function in shaping normative expectations for conduct, even if it is
ultimately unsuccessful in obtaining compensation for the plaintiffs.
However, especially in the transnational context, these potential benefits must
be weighed against other possibly more significant costs. Unlike in the anti-
terrorism context, Congressional immunity-stripping proposals for pandemics
do not currently appear to enjoy bipartisan support.
3. My analysis proceeds as follows. Part II details some of the claims
brought against China in U.S. courts. Part III describes the actions filed by
state attorneys general. Part IV discusses proposed amendments to the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which governs foreign state immunity
from civil suit in U.S. courts. Part V briefly considers the relevance of China’s
international legal responsibility to domestic suits and concludes.
II. Civil Lawsuits Brought by Private Plaintiffs
4. The first civil suit filed against China for COVID-19 appears to have been
filed by a Florida-based plaintiffs’ firm in mid-March 2020. Like many of the
privately initiated suits, Alters et al. v. People’s Republic of China (S.D. Fla.) is
styled as a class action, meaning that the named plaintiffs seek to represent a
class (or classes) of similarly situated plaintiffs. There is little chance any court
would certify the proposed classes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
The proposed class definitions include “[a]ll persons and legal entities in the
United States who have suffered injury, damage, and loss related to the out-
break of the COVID-19 virus.” It seems there are few persons, natural or le-
gal, who would not belong to one of the proposed classes.
5. The Florida complaint names various Chinese governmental entities as
defendants, in addition to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) itself. These
include the National Health Commission of the PRC, the Ministry of
Emergency Management of the PRC, the Ministry of Civil Affairs of the
PRC, the People’s Government of Hubei Province, and the People’s
Government of the City of Wuhan. The suit filed in April by the Attorney
General of Missouri (State of Missouri v. People’s Republic of China, E.D. Mo.)
also names the Chinese Communist Party and adds the Wuhan Institute of
Virology and the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Some of the plaintiffs are
now filing amended complaints to add new defendants and claims.






/chinesejil/article/19/2/229/5890051 by guest on 08 February 2021
6. The U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which was passed by
Congress in 1976, codifies the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity.
It contains a relatively expansive definition of the term “foreign state” to include
political subdivisions and agencies or instrumentalities of foreign states, as well
as entities that are organs of a foreign state or that are majority-owned by a for-
eign state. 28 U.S.C. § 1603. The statute provides both personal and subject-
matter jurisdiction over civil actions against foreign states that fall within certain
enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity. It appears that many
plaintiffs seeking redress against China for damages caused by COVID-19 are
attempting to serve all named defendants via the service provisions in the FSIA.
28 U.S.C. § 1608. Once a defendant is served, it has sixty days to respond to
the suit by filing an answer or—more often—a motion to dismiss. If a named
defendant does not respond to the suit, the FSIA authorizes a U.S. state or fede-
ral court to enter a default judgment only if “the claimant establishes his claim
or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e).
7. These suits raise multiple complex questions of transnational civil proce-
dure, including extraterritorial application of U.S. law, choice of forum and
abstention doctrines, due process rights of foreign litigants, cross-border dis-
covery of foreign government documents, and the availability of contempt
sanctions against foreign states, to name a few. They also raise substantive le-
gal issues including causation, contributory negligence, and the plaintiff’s
duty to mitigate damages. Before reaching those questions, however, a court
must “satisfy itself that one of the exceptions [to immunity] applies”—not by
adjudicating the merits (which would defeat the purpose of jurisdictional im-
munity), but by “apply[ing] the detailed federal law standards set forth in the
Act.” Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461, U.S. 480, 493–94 (1983).
8. The two most salient enumerated exceptions to foreign state immunity
for potential claims against China are the commercial activity exception and
the territorial tort exception. 28 U.S.C. § 1605. Yet the allegations in the
complaints do not appear to fall within these exceptions. The complaint in
Alters, which is representative of the actions by private plaintiffs, alleges that
“[t]he PRC and the other Defendants knew that COVID-19 was dangerous
and capable of causing a pandemic, yet slowly acted, proverbially put their
head in the sand, and/or covered it up for their own economic self-interest.”2
2 Complaint, Alters v. People’s Republic of China, Case No. 1:20-cv-21108-UU (S.D.
Fla., Mar. 13, 2020), at https://images.law.com/contrib/content/uploads/docu
ments/392/85094/Coronavirus-China-class-action.pdf.
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These are damning allegations, some of which are consistent with a timeline
compiled by the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service “based on avail-
able public reporting to date”. See Congressional Research Service, “Covid-19
and China: A Chronology of Events,” https://crsreports.congress.gov/prod
uct/pdf/R/R46354 (updated May 13, 2020). However, they do not fall
within an enumerated exception to the FSIA.
9. In order to fall within the commercial activity exception, the plaintiff’s
claims must be “based upon an act outside the territory of the United States
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and
that act causes a direct effect in the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
Alternatively, the complaint must seek money damages against a foreign state
“for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in
the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign
state or of any official or employee of that foreign state while acting within the
scope of his office or employment”. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5). Although the lat-
ter exception might seem to fit the circumstances here, courts have interpreted
it definitively as requiring a tortious act or omission of the foreign state in the
United States. See RESTATEMENT (4th) U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 457(1)
(2018). This interpretation is consistent with the prevailing understanding of
this exception in international law. See id. § 457(2).
10. It is important to emphasize that jurisdictional immunity does not
equal lack of legal responsibility under either domestic or international law.
The question is how best to allocate adjudicatory authority horizontally
among states and promote accountability for wrongdoing, while facilitating
cooperation among political and territorial communities to secure the well-
being of their populations.3
III. Enforcement Actions by State Attorneys General
11. The civil suits filed by the attorneys general of Missouri and Mississippi,
respectively, must fall within an enumerated exception to the FSIA in order to
proceed. They do not. Both attorneys general intend to serve all defendants
using the service provisions of the FSIA, thus seemingly conceding that they
all fall within the FSIA’s definition of a foreign state or its agency or
3 For an additional perspective from the author, see Chimène I. Keitner, Germany v.
Italy and the Limits of Horizontal Enforcement: Some Reflections from a United States
Perspective, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 167 (2013), at https://repository.uchastings.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article¼2095&context¼faculty_scholarship.
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instrumentality.4 The crux of the lawsuits, as framed by the complaint in the
Missouri case, is as follows:
During the critical weeks of the initial outbreak, Chinese authorities de-
ceived the public, suppressed crucial information, arrested whistle-
blowers, denied human-to-human transmission in the face of mounting
evidence, destroyed critical medical research, permitted millions of peo-
ple to be exposed to the virus, and even hoarded personal protective
equipment—thus causing a global pandemic that was unnecessary and
preventable. [Complaint, at 2.]
12. Among other causes of action, Missouri’s complaint includes a claim
for the tort of public nuisance under Missouri law on the grounds that
defendants’ conduct was “knowing, willful, and in reckless disregard of the
rights of the State and its residents”, and that economic and non-economic
damages in the “billions—and possibly tens of billions—of dollars” are the
“proximate result” of defendants’ conduct. It also alleges a breach of duty by
“restrict[ing] exports” of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and
“allow[ing] the export of ineffective PPE”, both of which the complaint char-
acterizes as commercial activities. However, the act of regulating markets is a
quintessentially sovereign activity. The U.S. Supreme Court has indicated
that “when a foreign government acts, not as a regulator of a market, but in
the manner of a private player within it, [then] the foreign sovereign’s actions
are ‘commercial’ within the meaning of the FSIA.” Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992). The allegations in these complaints do
not describe activities akin to those of “private player[s]” within a market.
Moreover, as the Court has made clear, “the issue [in defining commercial ac-
tivities under the FSIA] is whether the particular actions that the foreign state
performs (whatever the motive behind them) are the type of actions by which
a private party engages in ‘trade and traffic or commerce.’” Id. (emphasis in
original).5
4 But cf. Complaint, Missouri v. People’s Republic of China, Case No. 1:20-cv-00099
(E.D. Mo., Apr. 21, 2020), at https://ago.mo.gov/docs/default-source/press-
releases/2019/prc-complaint.pdf?sfvrsn¼86ae7ab_2 (stating that “the Communist
Party is not a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, and is
not entitled to any form of sovereign immunity”).
5 Of potential relevance, U.S. courts have recognized a foreign sovereign compulsion
defense against application of the U.S. antitrust laws in limited circumstances “when
a foreign sovereign compels the very conduct that the U.S. antitrust law would pro-
hibit.” See U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Federal Trade Comm’n, “Antitrust Guidelines
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13. Mississippi’s claims for violations of state antitrust and consumer pro-
tection law resulting from alleged PPE “hoarding” rely on a similarly flawed
understanding of the commercial activity exception.6 If a state-owned com-
pany negligently designs or manufactures PPE abroad, and the product is sold
in the United States and causes personal injury in the United States, then the
direct-effect requirement of the commercial activity exception would be satis-
fied. See REST. 4th FOR. REL. § 454, reporters’ note 8. That does not appear to
be the thrust of the allegations here.
14. As a general matter, political subdivisions play an increasingly salient
role in international law and international relations. Missouri and
Mississippi’s lawsuits (and any others that state attorneys general decide to
file) will work their way through the normal judicial process, as district court
judges determine whether or not the claims fall within an enumerated excep-
tion to foreign sovereign immunity under the FSIA. Denials of jurisdictional
immunity have been deemed immediately appealable under the collateral or-
der doctrine. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. If any of the claims were to proceed to trial,
the plaintiff states would be subject to reciprocal discovery on matters includ-
ing any alleged failure to mitigate damages by taking reasonable steps to pre-
vent the further spread of the virus.7
IV. Proposed Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act
15. Opening a country’s domestic courts to lawsuits against a foreign govern-
ment may be particularly tempting when other potential responses seem inad-
equate or ineffective in the face of catastrophic injury. The U.S. Congress has
done this before in response to acts of international terrorism. See 28 U.S.C. §
for International Enforcement and Cooperation” (Jan. 13, 2017) at 32, at https://
www.courtlistener.com/docket/17160343/1/state-of-mississippi-v-peoples-republic-
of-china/.
6 Complaint, State of Mississippi v. People’s Republic of China, Case No. 1:20-cv-
00168-LG-RHW (S.D. Miss., May 12, 2020), at https://www.courtlistener.com/
docket/17160343/1/state-of-mississippi-v-peoples-republic-of-china/.
7 Actions taken, or not taken, by the plaintiff states could also be relevant to determin-
ing whether a foreign country’s act outside the United States had a “direct effect”
within the United States, as required by the relevant prong of the commercial activ-
ity exception. A “direct effect” in this context “follows as an immediate consequence
of an act.” An effect is not direct if it is a “remote or attenuated consequence of the
act,” or if the effect “is caused by an intervening act.” REST. 4TH FOR. REL. § 454
cmt. e.
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1605A (exception for certain claims against designated state sponsors of ter-
rorism); 28 U.S.C. § 1605B (exception for tortious acts of a foreign state, ex-
cluding mere negligence, that cause injury resulting from an act of
international terrorism in the United States that is not an act of war).
16. Even absent foreign sovereign immunity, civil lawsuits against China
for most injuries in the United States caused by the spread of COVID-19
would not result in massive recoveries for plaintiffs. Different sections of the
FSIA govern a foreign state’s immunity from attachment and execution. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1609–1611. These provisions have been left largely intact by previ-
ous amendments, although the bill introduced by Missouri Senator Josh
Hawley would also curtail this immunity.8
17. Some members of Congress have become inured to warnings about the
potential foreign relations consequences of immunity-stripping legislation,
which they feel have not been borne out. Others have suggested that an exces-
sive emphasis on reciprocity concerns gives foreign states too loud a voice in
deliberations on domestic legislative provisions. This narrow understanding of
reciprocity as involving tit-for-tat lawsuits misses the bigger picture of the
foreseeable consequences for the United States of weakened immunity protec-
tions from the jurisdiction of other states. In 2019, the United States pro-
duced nearly 15% of world GDP ($87.2 trillion), with only around 4.3% of
the world’s population.9 This figure gives some sense of the United States’ po-
tential exposure to legal claims in other countries, whether meritorious or not,
which dwarfs that of virtually every other country in the world.
18. Precisely because of the United States’ relative economic and military
power on the world stage, the United States does not need to deploy the
“threat” of lawsuits in U.S. courts to influence other countries’ behavior.
Lawmakers are understandably frustrated when other tactics and tools of per-
suasion appear to fall short, but that is not a reason to jettison established
principles of foreign state immunity that protect the United States.
8 “Justice for Victims of Coronavirus Act” (Apr. 14, 2020), available at https://www.
hawley.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/Justice-for-Victims-of-Coronavirus-
Act.pdf.
9 Mark J. Perry, “Putting America’s Enormous $21.5T Economy Into Perspective”
(Feb. 5, 2020), at https://www.aei.org/carpe-diem/putting-americas-huge-21-5t-
economy-into-perspective-by-comparing-us-state-gdps-to-entire-countries/.
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V. The Connection Between Domestic Suits and International
Legal Responsibility
19. There is perhaps no less appropriate context for discarding principles of
foreign state immunity than a global pandemic. As Professor David Fidler has
written, “[p]athogenic threats with the potential for cross-border spread can
appear in any country.”10 Moreover, “[u]nder the principles of state responsi-
bility, separating what damage is attributable to China’s delayed reporting
and what harms arose because other governments botched their responses to
COVID-19 would be difficult.” This is true as both a practical and a concep-
tual matter.
20. It is highly doubtful that an alleged violation of the International
Health Regulations (2005) could provide a cause of action in U.S. courts un-
der prevailing case law. International dispute resolution bodies perform an es-
sential function in channeling legal claims against countries away from
domestic courts and into consent-based fora. International commissions have
played important fact-finding roles in the past, and can do so again in assess-
ing countries’ responses to the initial, and later, phases of the COVID-19 out-
break. In addition, insulating the institutions charged with protecting global
public health—especially, but not solely, the World Health Organization—
from undue pressure by member states remains a high priority. Instead, we
seem to be witnessing an opposite trend.
21. Civil litigation in domestic courts can perform the important social
functions of condemning harmful behavior, deterring future wrongdoing, and
securing compensation for injured parties using the coercive power of the
state. It is not well suited to perform these functions with respect to a foreign
state’s acts or omissions relating to the initial or continued spread of a deadly
virus.
10 David Fidler, “COVID-19 and International Law: Must China Compensate
Countries for the Damage?” (Mar. 27, 2020), at https://www.justsecurity.org/
69394/covid-19-and-international-law-must-china-compensate-countries-for-the-
damage-international-health-regulations/.
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